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THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT AND THE
HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE IN THE YEAR 1952
WILLIAM H. BECKER, JR.*
This discussion supplements the series of annual reviews of the treat-
ment of the humanitarian doctrine by the Missouri Supreme Court, pub-
lished in the Missouri Law Review. It closes with the cases reported in
Volume 252, Southwestern Reporter, 2d Series.
As stated in prior discussion in this Review, the terms "humanitarian
doctrine," "humanitarian negligence," and "humanitarian rule" have come
to be used by the Bench and the Bar of Missouri to comprehend the com-
mon law last clear chance rule, and also the unique Missouri humanitarian
doctrine. The Missouri courts permit recovery, despite contributory primary
negligence, in each of the three typical common law last clear chance
cases and in the true humanitarian case as well. The typical common law
last clear chance cases are restated from an earlier article as follows:
"Common Law Last Clear Chance Case No. 1:
"The peril to plaintiff's person, property, or both results from
physical helplessness caused by plaintiff's lack of care. Defendant
actually discovers the peril in time, thereafter, with safety to him-
self, to avoid damage to plaintiff by the exercise of care. This is
a simple last clear chance case. The plaintiff may recover for per-
sonal injury and property damage despite his negligence in prac-
tically all common law jurisdictions. This result is well settled in
Missouri and not expected to be challenged; but this is not a hu-
manitarian negligence case.
"Common Law Last Clear Chance Case No. 2:
"The facts are the same as in Case 1, except that the defendant
does not actually discover the peril, but in the exercise of care he
should have discovered it in time to avoid damage, by the exercise
of care and with safety to himself. As in Case 1, a majority of
courts permit plaintiff to recover for personal injury or property
damage under the last clear chance rule. This is not a humanitarian
negligence case, and the rule is not expected to be challenged.
"Common Law Last Clear Chance Case No. 3:
"The peril to plaintiff's person, property or both, results from
plaintiff's negligent inattentiveness (obliviousness in Missouri ju-
*Attorney, Columbia. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1932.
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dicial parlance). Defendant (as in Case 1) actually discovers the
peril in time, thereafter, to avoid damage to plaintiff by the exer-
cise of care. This is a last clear chance case. It is not a humanitar-
ian case. The rule that plaintiff may recover seems settled in
Missouri and elsewhere. There appears to be no serious challenge
to the soundness of the right of plaintiff to recover in this case."'
These three cases are sometimes referred to for brevity as follows:
Last clear chance case No. 1: Discovered helpless peril.
Last clear chance case No. 2: Discoverable helpless peril.
Last clear chance case No. 3: Discovered oblivious peril.
Under the general designation "humanitarian doctrine," the Missouri
courts have added a fourth type of case wherein the injured party may
recover despite or regardless of his contributory negligence. It is this
fourth type of case which is the subject of the unique Missouri humani-
tarian doctrine. A typical true humanitarian case may be described as
follows:
True Humanitarian Case No. 4
The injured person is in a position of imminent peril as a result
of his negligent inattentiveness (obliviousness). The injured party
could extricate himself from his peril by his own efforts, if he were
aware of his peril and used care. The defendant or party against
whom claim for damages is made does not actually discover the
peril of the injured party. Nevertheless, in the exercise of care the
party causing injury should have discovered the peril in time there-
after with safety to himself by the use of care to have avoided in-
jury to the plaintiff. In other words the party causing injury is
also negligently inattentive (oblivious). The Missouri courts permit
recovery by the injured party in this case; and in this respect are
more liberal in permitting recovery than courts of other jurisdic-
tions.
In an earlier article,2 attention is invited to the fact that under the
unique Missouri humanitarian doctrine (Case 4), both plaintiff and de-
fendant can make a case for recovery, each against the other, upon a
single assumed version of the facts, provided both parties suffer personal
injuries.
In the operation of motor vehicles, cases frequently arise in which
both plaintiff and defendant are injured. Under such circumstances, the
1. Becker, The Supreme Court and the Missouri Humanitarian Doctrinl
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question is frequently asked: Can both plaintiff and defendant recover
from each other simultaneously? Or the same question is stated in a dif-
ferent manner as follows: Is humanitarian negligence of the plaintiff a
defense to the recovery under the humanitarian doctrine as primary negli-
gence of the plaintiff (causally connected with the injury) is a defense to
an action based on primary negligence of the defendant?
In the common law last clear chance situations, these questions do not
occur, because, upon any single assumed version of the facts, the plaintiff
and the defendant cannot simultaneously make cases against each other.
An answer to these questions is anxiously awaited by those interested
in the theory and the practice under the Missouri humanitarian doctrine.
THE CASES THROUGH 1952
In 1952, as usual, much was written on the form of instructions and
upon the submissibility of cases under special factual circumstances.
The quality of the opinions dealing with the humanitarian doctrine
were much improved because of painstaking and minute review of the
factual circumstances, incorporating precise mathematical calculations
where the submissibility of last clear chance cases or humanitarian cases was
in doubt. And the court continued to write opinions reviewing instructions
in such a manner as to provide guidance for drafting instructions in future
cases. There seemed to be fewer. opinions apparently expressing personal
views of the author unrelated to the views of the court as a whole.
There were developments of importance in 1952. In McClanahan v.
St. Louis Public Service Company,3 the court en. banc clarified the law ap-
plicable in cases where the negligent act complained of created the peril
and almost simultaneously caused the injury. There had been two conflict-
ing lines of decisions governing the applicability of the humanitarian rule
under these circumstances. In the McClanahan case one line of decisions
was overruled and the humanitarian doctrine held inapplicable. At the
same time, in such cases the plaintiff was given the opportunity to seek
application of the rule which permits recovery for wilful, wanton, and
reckless conduct despite contributory negligence.
In another important case, Vietmeier v. Voss, 4 a carefully constructed
opinion by Judge Conkling announced a subsidiary doctrine which should
3. 251 S.W. 2d 704 (Mo. 1952).
4. 246 S.W. 2d 785 (Mo. Division No. 1, 1952).
[Vol. is
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make the Vietmeier case the leading case in Missouri on the submissibility
of failure to warn under the humanitarian doctrine and the last clear chance
rule.
In 1952, the court continued to have difficulty with the "almost escap-
ing cases." See for instance Stith v. St. Louis Public Service Companyu and
Turbett v. Tkompson,6 discussed hereinafter; and compare Hunt v. Chicago
Ill., St. P. & P. R. R.,7 discussed in an earlier article.8
Division Number 2, in George v. Allen,9 had an opportunity to discuss
fully the vexing question of whether humanitarian negligence of the plaintiff
is a defense to his action based on humanitarian negligence, but did not
do so.
In the course of the year 1952, indications were that the true humani-
tarian doctrine (as distinguished from the common law last clear chance
doctrine) would be called into question on the bases of its lack of logic and
its impracticability of administration in the age of automobiles. There also
were indications that there would be assaults upon the doctrine in the legis-
lature and attempts to substitute by legislation the rule of comparative
negligence, or proportional fault, or removal of the bar of contributory
negligence as a substitute for the humanitarian doctrine.
Cases in the Court En Banc
Melton v. St. Louis Public Service Company0 was a personal injury
action resulting from a street car-pedestrian collision at a street intersection.
The plaintiff was in oblivious peril, that is, negligently inattentive and
unaware of his peril. The defendant either was aware of the peril or in the
exercise of care should have been aware thereof. The plaintiff's principal
instruction submitted the case under the "humanitarian rule" upon the
theories, in the alternative, that the defendant was aware or should have
been aware of plaintiff's peril. Consequently, this case was submitted in the
alternative as a last clear chance case number three or true humanitarian
case number four. A verdict for the defendant was affirmed. Five of the
judges expressly concurred in the holding of the principal opinion that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. One
5. 251 S.W. 2d 693 (Mo. 1952).
6. 252 S.W. 2d 319 (Mo. 1952).
7. 225 S.W. 2d 738 (Mo. 1949).
8. 17 Mo. L. REv. 32, at 36, 37, 40-42. (1952).
9. 245 S.W. 2d 848 (Mo. 1952).
10. 251 SA. 2d 663 (Mo. 1952).
1953]
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judge concurred and one judge dissented. From the standpoint of the
humanitarian doctrine, the opinion is notable for its approval of defense
instruction Number 4 hypothesizing the inferable fact situation exonerating
the defendant.11
The case of McClanahan v. St. Louis Public Service Company,1 2 the
opinion in which was written by Judge Van Osdol, Commissioner of Divi-
sion Number 1, is one of the most important cases dealing with the humani-
tarian doctrine decided in recent years. In an earlier consideration of the
same case by the St. Louis Court of Appeals, that court, speaking through
Judge Houser, invited attention to the prior application of the humanitarian
rule to situations wherein a plaintiff could have been in imminent peril only
because of something the defendant was about to do, and when defendant
did it, plaintiff's injury almost immediately ensued. It was also pointed
out that recent decisions were in conflict on this point with earlier cases.
In the McClanahan case, the court en banc expressly overruled the de-
cisions holding the humanitarian rule to be applicable in situations where
the plaintiff was in imminent peril because of something the defendant was
about to do, and where plaintiff's injury almost immediately ensued fol-
lowing defendant's act. For instance, the doctrine of Bobos v. Kr'ey PIacking
Co.,13 and of all similar cases, was expressly overruled. At the same time,
the court held that such a case might be submissible as a case of wilful,
wanton, or reckless conduct, to which contributory negligence is not a de-
fense or against which a trespasserhas a right to be protected. (In the past,
the humanitarian rule was sometimes invoked in behalf of a trespasser who
was not in a position to recover on primary negligence though he was not
contributorily negligent.)
The McClanahan case was an action for damages for personal injuries
,o. a ten year old trespasser who was clinging to the outside of defendant's
moving street car. The operator was aware of the plaintiff's presence and
directed him to get off. When the plaintiff refused to get off, the operator
suddenly accelerated the speed of the street car and jerked the plaintiff
off causing his injury. The case was submitted on the "humanitarian rule."
The Missouri Supreme Court held that the case was not submissible under
the "humanitarian doctrine."
Technically speaking, under the definitions set out in the beginning of
11. Id. at 672.
12. 251 S.W. 2d 704 (Mo. 1952).
13. 317 Mo. 108, 296 S.W. 157 (1927). 5
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this article, the case would be a common law last clear chance case number
three if it were submissible on negligence principles. The plaintiff was
negligent in his conduct in continuing to cling to the moving car. He was
in danger but probably not in certain impending danger which constitutes
imminent peril. He was probably unaware of the intention of the operator
to suddenly speed up the car and throw him off. The operator was fully
aware of the presence and condition of danger to the plaintiff and of the
imminent peril which would result from the sudden acceleration of the street
car.
The court en bane held that the case was not submissible under the
humanitarian doctrine, but submissible as a case of wilful, wanton, and
reckless conduct to which contributory negligence is not a defense. The
opinion, while out of accord with many earlier decisions of the court, is
technically sound. This is an illustration of a type of case which for years
has been submitted under the formula of the humanitarian doctrine, but
which at common law is submissible under another theory. Under common
law principles, the case would be submissible in other states without
reference to the humanitarian doctrine, as a case of wilful misconduct.
This may be the beginning of a trend to confine the use of the term
"humanitarian doctrine" and the formula of the humanitarian doctrine to
cases which are technically and strictly humanitarian cases.
For the practitioner, the case has a practical lesson. If the application
of the humanitarian doctrine to the case in hand is doubtful, wilful, wanton,
and reckless conduct should be pleaded and submitted, provided the facts
warrant the necessary averments of fact.
Cases in Division Number One
The case of Vietmeier v. Voss- announces a doctrine which should make
this the leading case in Missouri on the submissibility of "warning cases"
under the humanitarian doctrine and the last clear chance doctrine. The
Vietineier case was a suit for damages resulting from personal injuries to a
five year old boy struck by a passing automobile as the boy ran into a
public street to retrieve a ball. The plaintiff claimed that a case was made
under the humanitarian doctrine in failing to warn. The court, in a care-
fully constructed opinion by Judge Conkling, held that no case was made
under the humanitarian doctrine. The time available for action by the
defendant and reaction time by the plaintiff was about two seconds, which
14. 246 S.W. 2d 785 (Mo. 1952).
1953]
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elapsed from the time peril arose until the time the automobile struck the
plaintiff. The significant language of Judge Conkling's opinion which will
probably be considered authoritative in future cases based upon failure to
warn reads as follows:
"A humanitarian case upon the theory of failure to warn is dif-
ferent from the usual humanitarian case upon the theory of failure
to stop. The theory of failure to stop is predicated solely upon the
basis that if the defendant himself had caused the instrumentality
to be stopped that the injury would have been thereby avoided.
But when plaintiff's theory and submission is predicated upon de-
fendant's failure to warn there is presupposed (and time must be
allowed for) a timely co-operative action by plaintiff in which to
heed the warning and escape injury. This principle is recognized
by the adjudicated cases. Harrow v. Kansas City Public Service
Co., Mo. Sup., 223 S. W. 2d 644.
"This court has often written in recognition of the wisdom of
that rule. To make a submissible jury case under the theory of
failure to warn under the humanitarian doctrine the evidence must
disclose that a reasonably sufficient time was afforded, after the
duty to warn arose during which time it was reasonably possible for
the horn on the car to have been sounded, for plaintiff to have
heard, understood and heeded the horn and for the plaintiff then to
have stopped short of running into the automobile. Smith v. Sied-
hoff, Mo. Sup., 209 S.W. 2d 233, 237; Kirkpatrick v. Wabash R.
Co., 357 Mo. 1246, 212 S.W. 2d 764, 769; Rose v. Thompson, 346
Mo. 395, 141 S.W. 2d 824; Thomasson v. Henwood, 235 Mo. App.
1211, 146 S.W. 2d 88; Bach v. Diekroeger, Mo. App., 184 S.W. 2d755."115
Kilroy v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. 16 was a suit for personal injuries
which arose out of a locomotive-pedestrian collision at an unidentified point
on defendant's railroad tracks. In an opinion by Judge Hyde, it was held,
on established principles, that no humanitarian case was made. The opinion
held there was a lack of proof of sufficient facts from which to infer the
constituent elements of the doctrines. In this case, the plaintiff was in
oblivious peril. Consequently, a submissible case if made would have been
a last clear chance case number three and a true humanitarian case number
four.
Silver v. Westlake17 arose out of a collision between a motor truck and
a bicycle rider in or near a city street. There was a verdict for the de-
15. Id. at 789.
16. 247 S.W. 2d 660 (Mo. 1952).
17. 248 S.W. 2d 628 (Mo. 1952).
[Vol. 18
7
Becker: Becker: Supreme Court and Missouri Humanitarian  1952
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1953
THE HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
fendant, which was affirmed on appeal. The case was submitted on primary
or "humanitarian negligence." The facts are not sufficiently clear to
classify the case. The case is notable for its holding that a sole cause de-
fense instruction, set out in the opinion, was not prejudicially erroneous
under the facts of the case. The instruction is no model, as Judge Van
Osdol states in the opinion of the court. In fact, any sole cause defense
instruction in a humanitarian case should be framed and used with caution,
since the decision of the court en bane in the case of Janssens v. Thompson.18
Stitk v. St. Louis Public Service Co.19 was an "almost escaping case."
The "almost escaping case" doctrine originally exemplified by Gann v. C.
R. I. & P. R.R .20 has caused considerable difficulty in administration.21
The action in the Stitk case was one for personal injuries resulting from
a street car-pedestrian collision in a street car loading zone. The case was
submitted on the humanitarian doctrine in failing to slacken the speed of
the street car. The plaintiff '&as aware of the approach of the street car but
oblivious of the imminent peril and not physically helpless. The defendant
was aware of the plaintiff's oblivious peril. Consequently, this is a common
law last clear chance case number three and not a true humanitarian case.
In an opinion prepared by Judge Lozier, four of the seven judges concurred
in the result only. The case illustrates the unsettled condition of the law
in the "almost escaping" situation.
In the StitL case, it was held that the plaintiff made a submissible
case; that the zone of imminent peril includes the zone in which the plaintiff
approached the defendant's track while apparently unaware of the peril
resulting from his movement and the proximity and speed of the street car,
even though the plaintiff was aware of the approach of the street car.
The Stitk case was held submissible on the ground that the evidence
supported the inference that the plaintiff could have escaped (not simply
iniglt have escaped) in the time and space available if the speed of the
street car had been slackened by timely action. The evidence showed that
the plaintiff lacked only a step of clearing the zone of imminent peril when
he was struck by the street car. Only one-third of a second was needed to
permit the plaintiff to clear the zone of peril. The evidence supported an
inference that there were two and a quarter seconds after the plaintiff was
18. 228 S.W. 2d 743 (Mo. 1950).
19. 251 S.W. 2d 693 (Mo. 1952).
20. 6 S.W. 2d 39 (Mo. 1928).
21. Cf. Hunt v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 225 S.W. 2d 738 (Mo. 1949).
1953]
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in imminent peril. The court held that the jury might find under those
circumstances that the street car could have been slackened sufficiently to
have permitted the plaintiff to escape injury. In view of the limited con-
currence with the opinion in this case, it seems fair to state that the rule
in the "almost escaping" cases is still unsettled and will have to receive
further attention by the court before it can be stated with reasonable
certainty.
On long established principles, a plaintiff's instruction in the Stith
case was held erroneous because it permitted consideration of antecedent
negligence in a case submitted on the humanitarian or last clear chance
doctrine.
Turbett v. Thompso "22 was another "almost escaping" case considered
by Division Number 1. In the Tairbett case it was held that no submissible
case was made. The case involved a suit for damages for personal injuries
resulting from a locomotive-pedestrian collision at a regular crossing at
night. The plaintiff was aware of the approach of the locomotive but
claimed to be oblivious of the danger of peril resulting from its approach.
The defendant was aware of the presence and movements of the plaintiff
but held not to be chargeable with knowledge of plaintiff's imminent peril
until the plaintiff was actually in the path of the locomotive or so close to
it that it was apparent from his speed and manner of moving that he would
not stop before reaching it. Under the peculiar facts of the Turbett case,
the doctrine of the Stithk case, supra, was held to be inapplicable.
The Turbett case was not a true humanitarian case. The defendant
was aware of the presence and movements of the plaintiff. Consequently,
the case, if submissible, would have been a common law last clear chance
case number one or number three.
Wofford v. St. Louis Public Service Company23 arose out of a motor
bus-pedestrian collision at a regular public street crossing at dusk. The
plaintiff was in oblivious peril. The defendant was aware of plaintiff's peril.
The case was submitted on the "humanitarian doctrine" in failing to stop
or to warn. Since the defendant was aware of plaintiff's peril and the
plaintiff was oblivious thereof, this was a common law last clear chance case
number three.
Upon established principles, in an opinion by Judge Conkling, it was
held that the plaintiff made a submissible case for failure to stop and failure
22. 252 S.W. 2d 319 (Mo. 1952).
23. 252 S.W. 2d 529 (Mo. 1952).
[Vol. 18
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to warn. The case is notable for the feature of adherence by the court to
the clarification of Cable v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R. 24 in the opinion in
Harrington v. Thompson25 and other recent cases of similar import.26 It is
held again in the Wofford case that the plaintiff's principal instruction need
not have hyphothesized the exact point where the imminent peril arose.
Division Number Two
Pulley v. Scott 2 7 was a suit for personal injuries sustained by a pedes-
trian running along the highway at night and struck from behind by an
automobile. The plaintiff was in oblivious peril. The defendant was aware
of the peril or in the exercise of care ought to have been aware thereof. It
was held that the plaintiff made a submissible case upon similar and estab-
lished principles. The plaintiff made a submissible common law last clear
chance case number three and a true humanitarian case number four.
Brandenburg v. Kasparianss was a personal injury case growing out
of a pedestrian-automobile collision at a regular crossing in a business street.
The pedestrian was in oblivious peril. The defendent either saw or should
have seen the pedestrian in peril in time to avoid the collision. In an opinion
by Judge Westhues, it was held that a submissible case was made under
the last clear chance or humanitarian rule. Under the facts a submissible
case was made under the last clear chance rule (Case 3) and in the alterna-
tive, the true humanitarian rule (Case 4).
In the Brandenburg case, the following instruction submitting sole
cause based upon plaintiff's negligence was held erroneous: 29
"The Court instructs the Jury that if you find and believe from
the evidence that on the occasion in question plaintiff was walking
from the north side towards the south side of Lindell Boulevard at
the place mentioned in evidence, and that defendant was driving an
automobile west on Lindell Boulevard approaching the place plain-
tiff was crossing, and that by the exercise of ordinary care plaintiff
could have discovered defendant's automobile so approaching, and
if you further find and believe from the evidence that plaintiff failed
to discover the presence and approach of defendant's automobile
before walking into the path of same, and that such failure, if any,
was negligent, and that such negligence, if any, was the sole, direct
24. 236 S.W. 2d 338 (Mo. 1951).
25. 243 S.W. 2d 519 (Mo. 1951).
26. See the prior discussion in 17 Mo. L. REv. 40, 43, and 47-48 (1952).
27. 247 S.W. 2d 767 (Mo. 1952).
28. 247 S.W. 2d 806 (Mo. 1952).
29. Id. at 807-808. 10
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and proximate cause of plaintiff's colliding with said automobile,
and that defendant was not guilty of the acts of negligence sub-
mitted to you in instruction numbered two, then your verdict
should be in favor of defendant and against plaintiff."
The court held that the foregoing instruction did not require the finding
of any facts which would exonerate "the defendant in not seeing the
plaintiff." This case is evidence of the continued critical appraisal of sole
cause defense instructions in cases arising under the last clear chance or
humanitarian doctrines.30
Kelley v. St. Louis Public Service Company3' involved a stationary
pedestrian struck by the swinging over-hang of a street car emerging from a
loop track. The plaintiff was oblivious of his peril. The operator of the
street car knew or should have known of the peril. The plaintiff made a
submissible case of last clear chance negligence (Case 3) and, in the al-
ternative, humanitarian negligence (Case 4).
In the Kelley case, the principal instruction under the "humanitarian
doctrine" given on behalf of the plaintiff was condemned for requiring a
finding that the street car's "over-hang extended out dangerously beyond
the rails and over the sidewalk" as the street car rounded the curved track.
It was held that the quoted language was a submission or injection of
primary negligence of the defendant on the authority of Robinson v. Kan-
sas City Public Service Company.32 This holding will seem hypertechnical
to some.
There was also criticism in the Kelley case of the principal instruction
for unduly extending the time and zone of imminent peril. This criticism is
interesting only in regard to the particular fact situation involved.
Johnson v. St. Louis Public Service Company3 arose out of a street
car-pedestrian collision near a street intersection. The plaintiff was in
oblivious peril but not helpless. The defendant was either aware of the
peril or in the exercise of care should have been aware thereof. The case
was submitted on the humanitarian doctrine for failure to warn. The
plaintiff made a submissible case of last clear chance negligence (Case 3)
and, in the alternative, humanitarian negligence (Case 4).
In an opinion by Judge Westhues, the principal instruction was held
to be erroneous for its failure to clearly indicate that the only negligence,
30. See Janssens v. Thompson, 360 Mo. 351, 228 S.W. 2d 743 (1950).
31. 248 S.W. 2d 597 (Mo. 1952).
32. 345 Mo. 764, 137 S.W. 2d 548 (1939).
33. 251 S.W. 2d 70 (Mo. 1952).
[Vol. 18
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considerable by the jury, was the breach of duty after imminent peril
arose. No new principles were announced in this case. Well established
principles were applied to a familiar fact situation. In determining the sub-
missibility of the case, Judge Westhues carefully analyzed the facts and
was reasonably liberal in drawing inferences favorable to the injured party.
George v. Allei'm3 was a case in which Division Number Two had an
opportunity to discuss whether or not a plaintiff who was guilty of negligence
under the humanitarian doctrine might recover thereunder. Perhaps the
discussion would have been obiter, perhaps not.
The George case arose out of the collision of two automobiles at a
street-highway intersection. The plaintiff sued for damages resulting from
personal injuries and the defendant asserted a counter claim for property
damage. Both plaintiff and defendant submitted their claims for recovery
solely under the "humanitarian doctrine." A trial by jury resulted in a
verdict against the plaintiff on his claim and against the defendant on his
counterclaim. The plaintiff appealed. The plaintiff was not oblivious but
was physically helpless when the peril arose. The defendant was aware of
the peril to the plaintiff. This was really a common law last clear chance
case number one. The defendant's sole cause instruction was held to be
erroneous for assumption of a controverted fact and because defendant's
instruction "E" was held to extend the doctrine of contributory negligence to
negligence in humanitarian cases.
The interesting feature of the George case is the ruling upon Instruction
"E" directing a verdict against the claim and counterclaim if both parties
were equally guilty of last clear chance or humanitarian negligence. The
opinion treated the instruction as a contributory negligence instruction, and
perhaps it was, but it was not an instruction on contributory primary
negligence. The instruction was held erroneous upon the authority of cases
dealing with the submission of contributory primary negligence in the last
clear chance or humanitarian cases. This instruction "E" submitted as a
defense that plaintiff and defendant were both guilty of last clear chance
or humanitarian negligence, of exactly the same quality and timing.
Instruction "E" reads as follows:
"The court instructs the jury that if you find and believe from
the evidence in this case that on September 27, 1947, plaintiff and
defendant collided at Highway 78 and Spring Branch Road, if so,
34. 245 S.W. 2d 848 (Mo. 1952).
19531
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and if you further find that when both cars reached a position of
immediately impending peril of collision with the other, the drivers
of each car, while in the exercise of the highest degree of care, saw
or could have seen the other in peril in time thereafter to have
slowed down, swerved or stopped and thereby have avoided said
collision, but that they both negligently failed so to do, if so, then
in such event neither party hereto is entitled to recover herein and
your verdict should be in favor of plaintiff on defendant's counter-
claim and in favor of defendant on plaintiff's claim."
It may be that the instruction in form was contradictory and confusing,
but we doubt that the Supreme Court of Missouri will eventually hold,
where the question is squarely presented, that a plaintiff guilty of humani-
tarian negligence may nevertheless recover on humanitarian negligence of
the defendant of the same quality and timing, especially if both sustain
personal injuries.
In common law last clear chance cases one, two and three, the parties
cannot be guilty of last clear chance negligence simultaneously upon any
single version of the facts in the very nature of the acts involved. But in
the true humanitarian case number four, plaintiff and defendant can be
simultaneously guilty of humanitarian negligence resulting in personal
injury to each. And in such a case an instruction of the type submitted in
the George case as instruction "E" would seem to be proper, unless simul-
taneous recoveries are to be permitted by way of claim and counterclaim
based on humanitarian negligence.
Since it seems that in the George case the plaintiff was not in im-
minent peril until he was so close to the path of defendant's automobile
that he could not stop before entering its path, this is not a true humani-
tarian case number four. Therefore, the disapproval of this type of in-
struction may be sound under the circumstances, but the authorities cited
do not seem to be in point.
In disapproving instruction "E," the court said:
"The instruction is novel, indeed, and defendant cites no case
in support of it."
In a true humanitarian case, would not the instruction (assuming it
to be proper in form) be supported by the many cases holding that a de-
fendant is not limited to converse instructions but may submit as a defense
any fact situation inferable from the evidence which would exonerate him?
(Vol. 18
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CONCLUSION
The decisions in 1952 indicate a continuing effort on the part of the
supreme court to clarify the humanitarian doctrine, to earnestly analyze the
involved fact situations presented, and to arrive at a fixed guide to
instructions.
There remains to be confronted and disposed of the task of answering
the questions suggested earlier in this discussion concerning the true
humanitarian case number four. The common law last clear chance features
of the humanitarian doctrine are sound and cause no difficulty. It is in
the true humanitarian case number four that the basic difficulties in logic
and experience will continue to arise.
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